As preparations for the 2023 general elections take shape, National Point undertook investigations to assess the potential risk factors that may likely cause electoral violence in Bayelsa State in the elections. This is based on the fact that elections in the state are often violence ridden. Data for this report is mined from field visits, community security architecture dialogues and election risk assessment programmes. Elections in Bayelsa State will take place in November 2024.
The political climate in the state is currently going through alignments and fusion of political interests. The alignments have however come with noticeable unrest with unresolved killings in the state. In April 2022, a notable APC politician, Mr. Sunday Frank-Oputu, was shot dead in his Yenagoa residence by gunmen. On July 11, 2022, reports indicated that a three-member gang suspected to be assassins killed an official of an indigenous pipeline surveillance firm identified as Mr Indukakpo Ogede in his hotel room in Yenagoa. The killing which was confirmed by the spokesman of Bayelsa State Police Command, Mr Asinim Butswat, was the latest in the series of killings in the state. In mid May 2022, a police officer and four others were killed in Idema-Otuabagi road in Ogbia Local Government Area. Similarly, in June 2022, the paramount ruler of Kalaba community in Yenagoa LGA, Chief Francis Kolubo, and the Chairman of the Community Development Committee (CDC), Samuel Oburo, were killed by yet unidentified gun men.
With the return to democracy in 1999, successive administrations amended the 1999 constitution (as amended), which gave 13 per cent derivation from oil proceeds to oil bearing states, and also
created intervention agencies like the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) and Ministry of Niger Delta. The steps provided hope that the plight of the people will receive considerable positive shift and also assuage the feelings of marginalization. However, the expectations have not been met as the interventions have had little or no impact on the region, especially in terms of the delivery of basic social amenities in communities. The implications therefore are the birthing of complex conflict drivers like politics across the region’s landscape.
The 2023 electoral process is reshaping and influencing the political landscape of the Niger Delta states. Prior to the commencement of the pre-election window, we witnessed the birth of new alignments across political parties in line with local and national dynamics. Relatedly, these dynamics determines the governance, security trend and related social patterns that shape the outlook of the electoral process in the region. Historically, the region though politically active with increasing political culture, remains highly susceptible to political occurrences that often serve as violent triggers.
In Bayelsa State for instance, the huge presence of an army of unemployed youths and feelings of economic marginalization, continue to serve as a major conflict threat to the relative peace and electoral process in the state. The state has a history of political violence with attendant fatalities. Some of the major red zones for political violence include: Nembe, Southern Ijaw and Ekeremor local government areas. The absence of viable economic activity in the state has also pushed a lot of youths into cultism, illegal oil bunkering, sea robbery, kidnapping and other vices.
The state has three senatorial districts namely: Bayelsa Central covering Kolokuma/Opokuma, Southern Ijaw and Yenagoa; Bayelsa East covering Brass, Ogbia and Nembe; and Bayelsa West covering Ekeremor and Sagbama, Local Government Areas.
A conflict scan across the political landscape of the state revealed that the political environment is still overwhelmed with the wounds of the last governorship election which posed a serious unhealthy rivalry between the two major political parties, the All Progressives Congress, APC and the Peoples’ Democratic Party, PDP. This is even made more complex due to the lack of party ideologies and structured manifestoes. Party organs are also manifestly weak and are controlled by strong individual politicians. Political parties are only visible during elections and become non-existent after elections. Many of them including major political parties do not have functional secretariats where party policies and governance issues are formulated and implemented. Parties in the state also do not provide the necessary constructive opposition to the ruling party but often rely on political ‘strong-men’ who adopt a rather adversarial approach in their scathing criticisms of government policies and programmes.
There is also a growing disquiet within the ruling Peoples Democratic Party (PDP). A common indicator of the uneasy calm in the party is the recent defection of the Chairman of Brass Local Government Area, Hon. Victor Inodumini Isaiah, with over 1,000 of his supporters to the Social Democratic Party (SDP). Hon.Victor is a staunch loyalist of ex-governor Seriake Dickson. His defection brings to light the deteriorating cold war between the former governor and the incumbent governor, Senator Douye Diri. Hon. Victor had accused Douye Diri during his defection, of sidelining most of the party stakeholders who fought for the victory of the PDP.
He said: “Based on my personal values, I can no longer remain in a party that is sharply divided and neglects die-hard members with no hope of solving the internal crisis, hence my decision to resign my membership.”
A general conflict scan on the political landscape of the state shows that factors likely to cause election violence during the 2023 election include: cultism, kidnapping, sea piracy and weak electoral institutions. Other electoral risk factors identified include drug abuse, illegal oil bunkering, commercialized electoral process and highly influential ex-militants.
National Point’s analysis of the major risk factors shows a disturbing weak curve within the major institutions with mandate to conduct a violence- free election. The institutions are politicians, the Independent National Electoral Commission,INEC, security agencies,the judiciary and the citizens.
Politicians/Political Parties
Politicians rely more on the use of violence and voter inducement to win elections than riding on the strength of a strong party ideology and clear implementable manifestos which address the developmental needs of the people. Most of the politicians in the state are stronger than the political parties. They also control party structures and impose their will on the overall party. Consequently, nomination tickets for political offices are hijacked by individuals without transparent and competitive primaries and this causes opportunities which should deepen the internal democratic culture and strengthen party organs are lost.
Citizens political ideology in Bayelsa State rely more on ‘dependent leadership’ which gives the false impression that people in authority are responsible for leadership.
From investigations ,this ideology is strengthened by many factors which include: lack of political education, lack of spirit of selfless service, citizens’ general apathy to non-oil related
cultism and kidnapping
i. Ezetu – sea piracy, cultism and kidnapping
j. Ekeni – sea piracy, cultism and kidnapping
Beyond the institutional weaknesses, kidnapping, sea piracy, and cultism rank as the highest election risk factors in the communities.
In response to the challenges of sea piracy and kidnappings on the water ways, the Bayelsa State Government recently called on the Federal Government to expedite action on the establishment of Marine Safety Corps to effectively address security challenges on the waterways in the country. The government stated that establishing the marine equivalent of the existing Federal Road Safety Corps would help in the fight against sea piracy, kidnapping and other crimes in the Niger Delta. The state deputy governor, Mr Lawrence Ewhrudjakpo who made the call said, “Our security challenges are more in the riverine areas and if we are able to properly police those areas, we would have done a lot to boost our security architecture. So, we need more gunboats to help police our rivers and rivulets and help cover their (criminals) escape routes. This will also help improve our oil production.
It is feared that if urgent steps are not taken, the challenges could mar the electoral process in the state. Cross section of community members also expressed worry that the challenges if not addressed, may lead to the rejection of postings to affected communities by election officials. Some Community Development Committee members (CDC) who spoke to National Point blamed politicians for the conflict challenges and also accused them of empowering cultistswith arms and ammunition.
In Ekeremor LGA, Security challenges in the area are a major concern to community stakeholders. A recent update from community security dialogues reveals that cultism, drug abuse, banditry and criminality are on the increase with alarming negative impacts on community well being. As part of community response to mitigate the challenges, community vigilantes now act as local police, conducting standard community policing protocols. While this is commendable, the approach lacks the needed logistics support as the vigilantes rely on the goodwill of spirited individuals for support in the provisions of basic security tools, etc. The approach is also susceptible to abuse as there are reported instances of jungle justice perpetrated by the local vigilantes. There are also allegations that some members of the vigilante belong to dreaded secret cults which are part of the conflict drivers in the community.
In Amassoma community in Southern Ijaw, investigations revealed that some cultists who fled the community after a combined police and vigilante onslaught against them two years ago, have returned to the community even with more atrocious activities. Report however stated that community vigilantes are working with the police to ensure that such returnees are apprehended.In Brass for instance, a community facilitator Mrs Gloria Ikio, informed National Point that the biggest security threat in the area is sea piracy. She informed that traveling through the waterways from Yenagoa and Nembe to Brass is like “traveling from earth to the mouth of a crocodile.” A security assessment of the Yenagoa-Nembe-Brass waterways showed that despite the high risk on the waterways, only a single JTF checkpoint is mounted at the instance of the Nigeria Agip Oil Company located on the route.As preparations for the 2023 general elections take shape, National Point undertook investigations to assess the potential risk factors that may likely cause electoral violence in Bayelsa State in the elections. This is based on the fact that elections in the state are often violence ridden. Data for this report is mined from field visits, community security architecture dialogues and election risk assessment programmes. Elections in Bayelsa State will take place in November 2024.
The political climate in the state is currently going through alignments and fusion of political interests. The alignments have however come with noticeable unrest with unresolved killings in the state. In April 2022, a notable APC politician, Mr. Sunday Frank-Oputu, was shot dead in his Yenagoa residence by gunmen. On July 11, 2022, reports indicated that a three-member gang suspected to be assassins killed an official of an indigenous pipeline surveillance firm identified as Mr Indukakpo Ogede in his hotel room in Yenagoa. The killing which was confirmed by the spokesman of Bayelsa State Police Command, Mr Asinim Butswat, was the latest in the series of killings in the state. In mid May 2022, a police officer and four others were killed in Idema-Otuabagi road in Ogbia Local Government Area. Similarly, in June 2022, the paramount ruler of Kalaba community in Yenagoa LGA, Chief Francis Kolubo, and the Chairman of the Community Development Committee (CDC), Samuel Oburo, were killed by yet unidentified gun men.
With the return to democracy in 1999, successive administrations amended the 1999 constitution (as amended), which gave 13 per cent derivation from oil proceeds to oil bearing states, and also
created intervention agencies like the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) and Ministry of Niger Delta. The steps provided hope that the plight of the people will receive considerable positive shift and also assuage the feelings of marginalization. However, the expectations have not been met as the interventions have had little or no impact on the region, especially in terms of the delivery of basic social amenities in communities. The implications therefore are the birthing of complex conflict drivers like politics across the region’s landscape.
